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CONWAY ET AL.The Self and Memory
THE SELF AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY:
CORRESPONDENCE AND COHERENCE
Martin A. Conway
Department of Psychology, University of Leeds, England
Jefferson A. Singer
Department of Psychology, Connecticut College, U.S.
Angela Tagini
Department of Psychology, University of Durham, England
A modified version of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s Self Memory System
(SMS) account of autobiographical memory and the self is introduced. Modifi-
cations include discussion of a fundamental tension between adaptive corre-
spondence (experience-near sensory-perceptual records of goal activity) and
self-coherence (a more abstracted and conceptually-rich long-term store of
conceptual and remembered knowledge). This tension is examined in relation
to each SMS component—the episodic memory system, long-term self, and
the working self. The long-term self, a new aspect of the model, consists of the
interaction of the autobiographical knowledge base and the conceptual self.
The working self, depending on goal activity status, mediates between epi-
sodic memory and the long-term self. Applications of the SMS to personality
and clinical psychology are provided through analysis of self-defining memo-
ries and adult attachment categories, as well as case histories of traumatic
memory. The SMS’s role in imagination is examined through a brief discussion
of Wordsworth’s poetry.
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In the Borges (1998) story, “Funes, his memory,” Ireneo Funes, after a fall
from a horse, finds that he has lost all capacity to forget any experience
past or present. Confined to his bed, he literally remembers everything:
The truth was, Funes remembered not only every leaf of every tree in
every patch of forest, but every time he had perceived or imagined the
leaf. He resolved to reduce every one of his past days to seventy thou-
sand recollections, which he would then define by numbers. Two con-
siderations dissuaded him; the realization that the task was
interminable, and the realization that it was pointless. He saw by the
time he died he would still have not finished classifying all the memo-
ries of his childhood. (Borges, 1998, p. 136)
Overwhelmed and aging prematurely, Funes dies at the age of 21 of pul-
monary congestion, drowned by the flood of his own recollections.
The fictional character of Funes captures a fundamental theme that
guides this paper’s exploration of the relationship of autobiographical
memory to the self. Specifically, we assert that autobiographical mem-
ory emerges from the intersection of two competing demands - the need
to encode an experience-near record of ongoing goal activity and the si-
multaneous need to maintain a coherent and stable record of the self’s
interaction with the world that extends beyond the present moment. The
first of these demands we call adaptive correspondence and the second,
self-coherence. The flexibility of the self-memory system to answer each of
these demands in an appropriate and calibrated manner defines the
healthy functioning of memory and self. Funes’ hypertrophied capacity
to record all aspects of ongoing reality (adaptive correspondence)
ultimately led to the destruction of any filtered or delineated sense of self
(self-coherence).
In the sections that follow we consider how different components of
the Self Memory System (SMS; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) medi-
ate the tension between these two competing knowledge demands
within the individual. To demonstrate applications of the SMS model to
research in personality, clinical and social psychology, we look at a spe-
cific type of autobiographical memory the self-defining memory (J.A
Singer, 2004b; J.A Singer & Blagov, 2004a, J.A Singer & Blagov, 2004b;
J.A Singer & Salovey, 1993) and examine its relationship to adult attach-
ment categories (Main & Goldwyn, 1998). We also look at the relation-
ship of adaptive correspondence and self-coherence in traumatic
memories. Finally, in the last section we draw on the work of the great
poet of memory, William Wordsworth (1770-1850), to illustrate how this
same tension between adaptive correspondence and self-coherence
engenders the creative products of imagination.
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ELABORATION OF THE SELF MEMORY SYSTEM
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) introduced the SMS as a model of
the relationship of autobiographical memory to the self. The SMS model
postulated that autobiographical memories were the transitory mental
constructions of a complex goal-driven set of control processes collec-
tively referred to as the working self. One of the main proposed opera-
tions of the working self was the generation of mental models (Craik,
1943; Johnson-Laird, 1983) that supported coherent realization of goals.
In this scheme autobiographical memories were merely one class, albeit
a highly distinctive class, of mental models generated from an underly-
ing knowledge base. Autobiographical memories are distinct for three
main reasons; they (1) contain episodic memories; (2) contain self
knowledge; and (3) are the result of goal processing.
In this opening section we elaborate an account of episodic memories
and goals to consider adaptive correspondence and self-coherence. We
then present a modified view of the Self Memory System that depicts an
episodic memory system interacting with the working self and the long-term
self (see Figure 1). We have introduced the Long-term Self to encompass
two aspects of non-immediate knowledge of the self—the autobiographi-
cal knowledge base and the conceptual self (See Figure 2). Later sections de-
scribe how the working self generates a dynamic model of the
psychological present by categorizing, evaluating, and prioritizing
goal-relevant knowledge and experience.
A key feature of the original SMS was that the working self was orga-
nized by a complex goal hierarchy that motivates and modulates cogni-
tion, affect, and behavior. However, the nature of goals and their
relation to memory in the SMS was not developed in detail. Before turn-
ing to the specific structures within our modified SMS, we offer some
more general remarks about the relationship of goals to memory.
GOALS
In our current model of the SMS’s working self, goals are viewed as pro-
cesses. These goal processes contain a standard or ideal, some mecha-
nism for assessing the discrepancy between the standard and current
state of the world, and plans for reducing or increasing the discrepancy
(see Carver & Scheier, 1998 for an extended discussion of goals). Thus,
the whole goal-subgoal hierarchy of the working self is itself a complex
process in which different sub-processes are either actively running and
motivating cognition, affect, and behavior, or are above some threshold
of activation and set to enter the current processing sequence when cued
by control processes. We view control processes as largely non-con-
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scious processes that assemble sequences of cognitions, affects and be-
haviors into mental models dedicated to the pursuit of goal-attainment
(see Norman & Shallice, 1980 and Shallice, 1988). By this view, goals
drive cognition. Furthermore, assessment of progress on goal attain-
ment is experienced as emotion (see Oatley, 1992). Cognition and
emotion are therefore linked by goals.
It is through this nexus of cognition, emotion, and goals that autobio-
graphical memories are initially assembled (see the section ahead on the
working self) and later constructed in acts of remembering. We suggest
that one critical function of memory is to keep track of progress in goal
attainment. In the short-term it is important to have very specific and de-
tailed episodic memories of recent activities if behavior is to be struc-
tured, aim-oriented, and non-repetitive. Brain injured patients with
anterograde amnesia who cannot form new episodic memories often
repeat actions.
To take an extreme example, the patient studied by Wilson, Baddeley,
and Kapur (1995), probably one of the most amnesic patients ever stud-
ied (the exact opposite of the fictional Funes), had very dense
anterograde and retrograde amnesia, and kept a series of diaries in
which every few minutes he repetitively wrote that each moment was
like “waking from the dead.” Keeping an accurate record of recent activ-
ities associated with goal processing is then a prerequisite of coherent
activity. Conway (2001) argues that this is achieved in the short-term, i.e.
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FIGURE 1. The Self-Memory System.
any twenty-four hour period, by the formation of episodic memories
(these are considered in detail in the next section). In the longer term epi-
sodic memories become integrated with more abstract autobiographical
memory knowledge structures such as general events and lifetime
periods.
The period of consolidation or integration may be quite extended in
time. Linton (1986), for example, provides some evidence that it may ex-
tend over a two-year period. It is even possible that the integration of ep-
isodic memories with memory knowledge structures is not fully
achieved until the goals to which they relate have themselves been
achieved or abandoned. In our terms this could equate to the transition
from one lifetime period to another. One suggestion here is that the rep-
resentation of a rememberer’s current lifetime period in memory is not
fully or finally integrated with other autobiographical knowledge until
a transition is made in the goal structure of the working self. More gener-
ally, we believe that goal-transitions are critical events in memory for-
mation and that they psychologically or cognitively mark event
boundaries (cf. Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001). Thus, when one part of the
working self goal structure is dysfacilitated and the ensemble of inter-
locked networks that supported that goal processing disassemble, a new
set of goals are instantiated. This marks the psychological boundary of
the end of one event and start of another.
The critical point here is that disruptions or status changes in ongoing
goal activity are experienced as challenges to existing self-coherence. At
such moments, control processes in the working self shift from inhibi-
tion of autobiographical memories (which might distract attention from
current goal activity), to instantiation of a retrieval mode that prompts a
search through the long-term self. The attentional focus of the working
self increasingly becomes engaged with processing remembered reality
in parallel with the present moment. If the threat to goal attainment per-
sists, this shift from adaptive correspondence to the demand for self-co-
herence will magnify, and knowledge based in the long-term self is
likely to dominate attention. Having laid out this general framework of
the relationship of goal activity to memory in the working self, let us turn
to a more specific elaboration of each of the components of the SMS.
EPISODIC MEMORY SYSTEM
One of the fundamental conceptual issues in research into human mem-
ory is whether (episodic) memories are best thought of in terms of ‘co-
herence’ or ‘correspondence.’ If memories are conceived of as primarily
serving coherence functions, e.g. having an integrated ‘life story’ (Bluck
& Habermas, 2001), then issues relating to memory accuracy are second-
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ary. In contrast, if memories are viewed as representations that corre-
spond to reality, then issues of accuracy become paramount and
questions about coherence are secondary, if considered at all.
According to the SMS model, memories represent information about
progress in goal attainment and therefore have to reflect reality to at least
some extent. On the other hand, the working self operates to make knowl-
edge and memories that confirm and support current self-conceptions
highly available (see McAdams, 2001, for a review) and, as we shall see,
may also operate to distort and/or inhibit memories that undermine the
current self. Thus, from the perspective of the SMS model coherence and
correspondence are equally important, but each for different reasons. In
the short-term episodic memories must keep an accurate record of
goal-relevant activities, the primary purpose of which is to minimize dys-
functional repetitions of action sequences. For example, if we could not re-
call that we had just locked the door to the house, we would endlessly
return to lock it and never leave the driveway. Adaptive correspondence
serves the specific function of allowing the working self to keep track of
where it is in currently executing goal space. In the long-term, however,
the goal systems of the working self move on to other goals and goal se-
quences - goal transitions - and the comparatively few episodic memories
that are subsequently retained become linked to more enduring
long-term knowledge in which their function becomes one of coherence.
That is, as Markus and Nurius (1986) originally suggested, self-coherence
binds the current working self to remembered reality and supports the
generation of different images or versions of the self-in-the-past and the
self-in-the-future. When the connection between episodic memories and
the self becomes disrupted, as occurs following several different types of
brain damage (see Conway & Fethenaki, 2000, for a review) and in certain
forms of psychopathological illness, then coherence breaks down and
ungrounded delusional versions of the self, divorced from reality,
emerge.
The episodic memory system contains, then, experience-near event
specific sensory-perceptual-cognitive-affective details that invoke the
visual imagery and autonoetic experience of mentally “reliving” a past
event (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). These memories are of compar-
atively short time-slices of experience (seconds, minutes, hours) and are
formed at event boundaries when a change in goal-processing occurs
(cf. Zacks et al., 2001). During the course of a day many episodic records
will be formed by the working self and many of these will remain avail-
able to recall for short periods of time. Possibly many are lost during a
sleep cycle with only some, because of their goal-relevance, being re-
tained for longer periods of time during which they are slowly
integrated with autobiographical knowledge.
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By far, the majority of episodic memories are lost fairly rapidly, and
these have been rather aptly described by Wordsworth in his autobio-
graphical poem The Prelude (1805/1984) as memory for “the perishable
hours of life” (XV11, 439-496). They are, however, only ‘perishable’ be-
cause they have served their function of retaining, albeit briefly, knowl-
edge about transient goal-related activities. As depicted in Figure 1, the
episodic memory system can provide input to the working self and so
fulfill its adaptive correspondence function of keeping track of plan exe-
cution in the course of ongoing goal processing. At the same time memo-
ries may become integrated with knowledge and ground conceptual
autobiographical memory knowledge structures in remembered reality.
Finally, we note that from a brain perspective it has become clear that
episodic memories may be stored in networks situated towards the pos-
terior of the brain in the medial and posterior temporal lobes and in the
occipital lobes (see Conway, Pleydell-Pearce & Whitecross, 2001, for a
review). Conway (2004) argues this may be a phylogenetically older
memory system consisting of the medial temporal lobe memory system
(Moscovitch, 1992, 1995) and occipital networks. The suggestion is that
this is primarily a cue-driven memory system with relatively little in the
way of conceptual organization. Cues that map onto memories activate
them, i.e. memories are content-addressable. When the mapping is tight,
major activation results; for weaker mappings the activation is less
strong and more diffuse. This temporal-occipital memory system is con-
trolled by a frontal-temporal system that can channel patterns of activa-
tion by elaborating the cues used to probe the older system; it can also
inhibit patterns of activation from conscious awareness, and it can pref-
erentially raise activation levels of sets of knowledge structures so that
they become highly accessible. The phylogentically later-developing
frontal-temporal system contains the working self and what we now
term the long-term self.
LONG-TERM SELF
In the original specification of the SMS the more permanent aspects of the
self that interacted with the autobiographical knowledge base to provide
self-relevant information were not fully specified (Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Here we draw on social-cognitive models of per-
sonality (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987, 1989; Cervone & Shoda, 1999;
Kihlstrom & Hastie, 1997) to propose an integrated Long-term Self that
contains the knowledge required by the working self to organize and
instantiate active goal processes. As depicted in Figure 2 the long-term
self consists of the Autobiographical Knowledge Base, and the Conceptual
Self. Each of these is now considered in turn.
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THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL KNOWLEDGE BASE
The autobiographical base consists of the lifetime period and general
event knowledge structures that combine with the episodic memory
system to generate specific autobiographical memories (see Figure 2).
As indicated in the original SMS model, “lifetime periods” are larger
units that reflect particular overarching goals and activities, for exam-
ple, early years of marriage, graduate school, or a period of financial
hardship. General events are categories of events linked across rela-
tively brief time periods (a week, a day, a few hours) or organized by a
shared theme, e.g., first-time experiences, academic meetings, and so
forth. These types of organizing personal conceptual knowledge come
into being in response to changes in goal processing. For example, as one
changes job, house, or relationship, one’s stable present gradually trans-
forms into lifetime period knowledge. The emotional nature of periods
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FIGURE 2. Generation of autobiographical memories.
of transition may reflect the re-organization of the working self goal hi-
erarchy and the formation of lifetime period structures in long-term
memory (see Pillemer, 1998, for some related findings). Smaller units of
conceptual knowledge, such as general events, may similarly arise but
in response to more local rather than global goals.
We now propose to add a third level to this autobiographical knowl-
edge base, the Life Story Schema, which consists of even more global
personal history information than lifetime periods (Bluck & Habermas,
2000, 2001). The life-story schema consists of individuals’ understand-
ing of how the normative life story is constructed within our culture.
This normative structure draws on social cognitive conventions with re-
gard to temporal order, dominant themes, causal attributions, and
evaluative stances toward experiences. It takes an individual’s life as a
whole and creates more general structures (e.g., my life as a woman in
21st century England or my career as a professor at an American univer-
sity). The life story schema contributes to the individual’s development
of a more elaborated life story, which McAdams (1985, 2001) has argued
is a key aspect of identity. The life story includes generalizations about
“life chapters” and themes, as well as connections to cultural myths and
narrative structures (e.g., recovery stories, J.A. Singer, 1997; “redemp-
tion themes,” McAdams, in press, and generational identity themes, see
Conway & Holmes, 2004).
When the working self initiates a retrieval model that accesses the auto-
biographical knowledge base of the long-term self, generative retrieval
usually begins at the general event level (Haque & Conway, 2001). When
these events intersect with lifetime periods and the life story schema, a
temporal and goal sensitive framework can guide search through specific
episodic events stored within the episodic memory system. The pattern of
activation that synthesizes the structures of the autobiographical knowl-
edge base with specific episodic images from the episodic memory sys-
tem yields the specific autobiographical memories that reach awareness.
In a Social Intelligence model of the self, Cantor and Kihlstorm (1985,
1987, 1989) would refer to these emergent autobiographical memories as
declarative episodic knowledge. Neisser (1988) has also referred to this loca-
tion of the self in specific temporal episodes as the extended self.
THE CONCEPTUAL SELF
Interacting with the autobiographical knowledge base and contributing
to the organization of its hierarchical units and thematic grouping of life-
time periods and general events is the Conceptual Self (see Figure 2). The
Conceptual Self (see also Neisser, 1988) corresponds to Declarative-Se-
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mantic knowledge in Cantor and Kihlstrom’s model, and to “traits” in
Klein and Loftus (1993), both of which are separate from episodic memo-
ries. Interestingly in cases of amnesia following brain damage, knowl-
edge from the conceptual self is often preserved while access to associated
memories is lost (e.g. Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996; and see Conway &
Fthenaki, 2000 for a review). Even more interestingly, some evidence indi-
cates that the Conceptual Self cannot change once the ability to form new
episodic memories is lost (cf. O’Connor, Cermak, & Seidman, 1995). The
Conceptual Self is then depicted as a separate system in Figure 2 and con-
sists of non-temporally specified conceptual self-structures, such as per-
sonal scripts (Demorest, 1995; Thorne, 1995; J.A. Singer & Salovey, 1993;
Tomkins, 1979), possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986), self-with-other
units (Ogilvie & Rose, 1995), conceptual aspects of internal working mod-
els (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973, 1980), relational schemas (Baldwin, 1992),
self-guides (Strauman, 1990; Strauman & Higgins, 1987), attitudes, values
and beliefs. All of these units are abstracted knowledge structures that ex-
ist independently of specific temporally defined incidents, but are con-
nected to autobiographical knowledge and the episodic memory system
to activate specific instances that exemplify, contextualize, and ground
their underlying themes or concepts. The units of the conceptual self are
socially-constructed schemas and categories that help to define the self,
other people, and typical interactions with others and the surrounding
world. These schemas and categories are drawn largely from the influ-
ences of familial and peer socialization, schooling, and religion, as well as
the stories, fairy-tales, myths, and media influences that are constitutive
of an individual’s particular culture (Bruner, 1990; Pasupathi, 2001;
Shweder & Bourne, 1984). As Figure 2 indicates, the reciprocal arrow
between the autobiographical knowledge base and the conceptual self
signifies that each informs and constrains the other.
The conceptual self consists, then, of abstracted knowledge about the
self contextualized in terms of a person’s life by autobiographical
knowledge and ultimately grounded in episodic memories of specific
experiences. Thus, an individual who held a view of himself as ‘practi-
cal’ instead of ‘intellectual’ might have a lifetime period representation
of his time at university as being largely negative. General event and
specific episodic memories might be preferentially available to confirm
this belief (see Beike & Landoll, 2000). In general, conceptualizations of
the self and of the existential problems faced by the self at different
points in the life span are intimately connected to autobiographical
knowledge and episodic memories (Conway & Holmes, 2004;
Csikzentmihalkyi & Beattie, 1979). Moreover, transitions and (goal)
changes in the conceptual self may have profound effects upon knowl-
edge access and the capacity to recapture former patterns of activation in
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the autobiographical knowledge base and the working self (see
Pillemer, 1998, for a review).
To take a literary example, Proust, in the volume ‘The Fugitive’ of his
novel Remembrance of Things Past, (1925/1981) describes a moment when
Marcel discovers that Albertine is alive, but he cannot recapture the
emotions he once felt for her. The self, associated with her, is no longer in
the foreground, or “active”:
I should have been incapable of resuscitating Albertine because I was
incapable of resuscitating myself, of resuscitating the self of those days.
Life, in accordance with its habit, which is, by incessant infinitesimal la-
bours, to change the face of the world, had not said to me on the morrow
of Albertine’s death: ‘Become another person,’ but, by changes too im-
perceptible for me to be conscious even that I was changing, had altered
almost everything in me, with the result that my mind was already ac-
customed to its new master-my new self-when it became aware that it
had changed; it was to this new master that it was attached. (Proust,
1925/1981, p.657)
And in an earlier passage when he discovers that Albertine has aban-
doned him
...and thus, at every moment , there was one more of those innumerable
and humble ‘selves’ that compose our personality which was still un-
aware of Albertine’s departure and must be informed of it... I was
obliged...to announce to all these beings, to all these ‘selves’ who did not
yet know of it, the calamity that had just occurred ... There were some of
these ‘selves’ which I had not encountered for a long time past. For in-
stance (I had not remembered that it was the day on which the barber
called) the ‘self’ that I was when I was having my hair cut. I had forgot-
ten this ‘self,’ and his arrival made me burst into tears, as, at a funeral,
does the appearance of an old retired servant who has not forgotten the
deceased. (p.437)
These vivid passages accurately capture the relation of current and past
conceptual selves to periods of transition and change. We also note in the
first passage Proust’s insight that change is difficult and occurs imper-
ceptibly (outside conscious awareness), a point to which we return
when discussing traumatic memories below.
THE WORKING SELF
In the original SMS model the working self was viewed largely as con-
sisting of a complex hierarchy of goals that drove behavior and from
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which mental models (Craik, 1943; Johnson-Laird, 1983) could be de-
rived, for example, to guide memory construction. In addition it was
proposed that there were other working self control or executive pro-
cesses that modulated goal pursuit and that also acted to coordinate cog-
nition so that mental representations did not enter processing sequences
inappropriately. In these respects the concept of the working self was
closely related to other proposals concerning control processing (e.g.,
Norman & Shallice, 1980; Baddeley, 1986, 2001). However, following the
ideas of contemporary self-regulation theorists (Austin & Vancouver,
1996; Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1998, 1999; Vallacher & Nowak, 1997;
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), the working self was principally viewed as
an agent for goal processing.
Although we continue to see the working self as engaged in goal regu-
latory processes, we also see it as more than simply a comparator. The
working self organizes current experience or what shall we refer to here
as the psychological present. We conceive of this as a period stretching
back to some recent point in goal history that forms an event boundary
(Zaks, et al., 2001) and forward to some prospective target point in goal
processing (a future possible event boundary), with ‘now’ located some-
where perhaps close to the center of the period. One possibility is that
episodic memories are summary records of the psychological present
and are formed as the working-self goal configuration, which defines a
particular instance of the psychological present, changes in some
specific way.
Representation of the psychological present can be conceived of in
terms of three general principles: categorization, evaluation, and prioritiza-
tion (J.A. Singer, 1995). These principles of organization date back at least
to Aristotelian classifications (Gardiner, Metcalfe, & Beebe-Center, 1937)
and Kant (1790, cited in Gardiner, Metcalfe, & Beebe-Center, 1937) who
saw them as three different processes by which the mind divides the
world. He argued that we apply feelings or preferences to the
world—what he called “judgment.” We also divide up the world into cat-
egories that vary in abstraction—what he called “pure reason,” and we
also perceive sequences of events or causal relations—what he called
“practical reason.” These divisions can be translated into the primary ac-
tivities of the working self, which are to categorize and organize the psy-
chological present in terms of extant goals; to evaluate and signal
preferences about this (e.g., positive-negative, good-bad) and in response
to establish priorities and order goal processing sequences. The identifica-
tion, evaluation, and prioritization of the psychological present in terms
of goals by the working self allocates the distribution of attentional re-
sources. It is perhaps this attentional distribution that determines in large
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part which specific event features will be retained in an episodic
memory’s summary record of an epoch of the psychological present.
Recent neuroscience research seems to point to exactly this kind of
processing activity by different affective and cognitive structures within
the brain. Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & Kalin (2003) have argued
that cognitive-affective systems in the prefrontal cortex, anterior
cingulate cortex, hippocampus, and amygdala are involved in activity
concerned with the processing of approach and avoidance goals. The
prefrontal cortex may play a vital role in the capacity to anticipate affec-
tive outcomes, and based on this anticipation, hold off more immediate
goal pursuits in the interest of more important goals. The anterior
cingulate cortex may mediate among conflicting goals, and in conjunc-
tion with the prefrontal networks, set priorities for where attention and
goal-related action should be directed. More toward the mid-brain, the
hippocampus may be involved in the linkage of affect to specific con-
texts that engender positive or negative affective responses. Pathologi-
cal affective states, such as depression or mania, might be connected to
ineffective functioning of the hippocampus with regard to context. For
example, Davidson et al. (2003) reported studies that link lingering de-
pression, despite no clear contextual clues warranting this response, to a
reduction in the size of hippocampus. Finally, the amygdala (LeDoux,
1996) may play a particular role in evaluating threatening stimuli and
generating defensive responses, as well as in the consolidation of
emotional experiences in memory.
What integrates all of these brain networks is their effort to coordinate
goal processing in the individual. The prefrontal cortex (the likely loca-
tion of working self networks, see Conway, et al., 2002), in communicat-
ing to the rest of the brain about anticipated affect, determines that
certain appetitive goals should take precedence over others. The ante-
rior cingulate cortex, by monitoring conflicts in goal states, feeds back
information to the prefrontal cortex about where priority among goals
might be placed. The hippocampus sets situational and temporal limits
on emotional investment in particular goals, while the amygdala relies
on prior experience to guide the overall system toward or away from
particular goal concerns. In all of these instances, stimuli received by the
brain are constantly categorized, evaluated and ordered on the basis of
goals. The interlocking of these systems (Damasio, 1989) then results in
further coordinated allocation of biological, cognitive, affective, and be-
havioral resources in creating, modulating, and motivating a complex
mental model of the psychological present that will determine the
formation of episodic memories.
The working self, then, in generating a goal-oriented mental model of
the psychological present, implicitly creates constraints placed on a re-
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cord of a period (what one might call a psychological ‘moment’). The
psychological moment is defined by goal instantiation at the start and
close of the moment and by some goal-driven distribution of attentional
resources in between these two points. Thus, as proposed in the original
SMS model, the working self mediates the formation of memories. How-
ever, this is a complex process that, by our earlier principle of adaptive
correspondence, will be strongly influenced by the pattern of goal pro-
cessing occurring in a psychological moment, which in turn derives
from the working self processes of goal categorization, evaluation, and
prioritization operating during the psychological present.
Having considered conditions that might lead to the formation of au-
tobiographical memories, we now address the conditions under which
significant autobiographical memories might be retrieved and the kind
of role these memories play in the balance between adaptive correspon-
dence and self-coherence. In each of the next sections, we address partic-
ular kinds of autobiographical memories that can provide critical input
to the working self and that draw to different degrees on the episodic
memory system, the autobiographical knowledge base, and the
conceptual self.
SELF-DEFINING MEMORIES
A self-defining memory (SDM) is a specific type of autobiographical
memory that has the following attributes: affective intensity, vivid-
ness, high levels of rehearsal, linkage to similar memories, and connec-
tion to an enduring concern or unresolved conflict (J.A. Singer &
Moffitt, 1991-1992; J.A. Singer & Salovey, 1993). Self-defining memo-
ries can be distinguished from other types of vivid memories. For ex-
ample, flashbulb memories, as originally defined by Brown and Kulik
(1977) are a particularly vivid and affective form of personal event
memory (Pillemer, 1998), often about important public events.
Conway (1995) has identified four interrelated variables that converge
to produce these memories—surprise, consequentiality, importance,
and emotion. Having these qualities does not necessarily indicate,
however, that the memory is central to enduring goals or conflicts
within the personality.
Though one of the authors can remember exactly where he was when
he learned of the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center, he
cannot say that this memory relates directly to the central themes or con-
flicts that preoccupy his sense of identity. It was surprising, consequen-
tial, important, and affective, but not self-defining. Thus, while some
personal event memories may share the qualities of vividness and affec-
tive intensity ascribed to self-defining memories, and in some cases, may
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be repetitively thought about for periods of one’s life due to a proliferation
of external cues (e.g., the media’s flood of images of destruction related to
the World Trade Center attack), the two distinguishing criteria for self-de-
fining memories that differentiate them from other important and affec-
tive personal event memories are: (1) their linkage to other memories
within the individual that share similar narrative themes and (2) their rel-
evance to the individual’s enduring concerns or unresolved conflicts.
Both of these features—linkage of similar memories and relevance to
concerns and conflicts—have been supported through research on indi-
viduals’ motivations and goal pursuits. For example, Thorne, Cutting,
and Skaw (1998) looked at young adults’ important relationship memo-
ries generated in two interviews over a 6-month period of time. Partici-
pants had freedom to describe similar or different relationship episodes
in the second interview. Thorne et al. scored the memories for social mo-
tives for the memories that varied from Time 1 to Time 2, as well as the
points of emphasis in the “twice-told” memories. For both unique mem-
ories and repeated memories, the authors found “moderate thematic
consistency” (p. 258), indicating that these memories, even when vary-
ing in content, reflected similar motivational themes and narrative
structures.
In an earlier study, Demorest and Alexander (1992) had raters code in-
dividuals’ significant personal memories for overarching interpersonal
scripts. A month later, these same individuals generated a set of fictional
scenarios. Raters coded the themes of these scenarios and found striking
overlap in terms of thematic continuity between the original memories
and the imaginary stories. These results, along with Thorne et al. (1998),
suggest that individuals link remembered and imagined experiences
through personally significant themes. These themes originate, accord-
ing to the SMS model, from the goals of the working self, but later can
also serve to influence its ongoing goal processing.
As further evidence of the relationship of self-defining memories to in-
dividuals’ enduring conflicts and concerns, Singer and colleagues
(Moffitt & J.A Singer, 1994; J.A Singer, 1990) found the affective quality
of self-defining memories to be a function of the relevance of the memo-
ries to the attainment of a person’s most desired goals. This finding
holds not only for memories relevant to the attainment of approach
goals, but also for memories about active efforts to avoid the conse-
quences of undesired outcomes (Moffitt & J.A. Singer, 1994). J.A. Singer,
King, Green, & Barr (2002) additionally reported that the more personal
growth students attributed to memories that grew out of community
service experiences, the more likely these students were to place an over-
all emphasis on “generative” goal pursuits in their lives (see de St. Aubin
& McAdams, 1995).
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Similarly, in examining the relationship of turning point and other sig-
nificant personal memories to overall themes of the personality,
McAdams (1982; McAdams, Hoffman, Mansfield, & Day, 1996) has con-
sistently found that power-oriented memories are linked to individuals’
agentic motives, while intimacy-oriented memories reflect communal
motives in individuals. Jardine (1999) found that her sample of women
counselors who experienced life transitions during their clinical training
associated themes from their self-defining memories with their set of
“possible selves” (Markus & Nurius, 1986). In a series of clinical case
studies involving both individual and couples psychotherapy, Singer
has demonstrated that self-defining memories are linked to critical rela-
tionship themes that are expressed in both clients’ intimate relationships
and the transference dynamics of the therapy (J.A. Singer, 2001; J.A.
Singer & Blagov, 2004a; J.A. Singer & Blagov, 2004b; J.A. Singer &
Salovey, 1996; J.A. Singer & J. L. Singer, 1992; J.A. Singer & J. L. Singer,
1994).
In addition to their linkage to goals, SDMs also can play directive and
mood regulatory functions for the self (Bluck, 2003; Pillemer, 1998,
2003). For example, SDMs have been found to play a role in providing
life lessons or “integrative meanings” that help individuals in optimal
adjustment and personal growth. Blagov and J.A. Singer (2004) demon-
strated that individuals with larger numbers of self-defining memories
that contained reflective themes or messages, as reliably coded by three
raters (see J.A. Singer & Blagov, 2002 for a SDM coding manual), dis-
played optimal levels of self-restraint and emotional expression, as mea-
sured by the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory Short Form (WAI-SF -
Weinberger, 1997, 1998). Thorne, McLean, and Lawrence (2004) found
that, compared to other types of personal memories, individuals were
more likely to rely on self-defining memories involving tension or goal
conflict to provide insights and life lessons.
Individuals also employ personally significant and self-defining
memories to regulate their mood states. Josephson, J.A. Singer, and
Salovey (1996) demonstrated that non-depressed individuals enlisted
positive memories to repair negative moods, while mildly depressed in-
dividuals were less likely to recruit positive memories after a negative
mood had been induced. Similarly, Moffitt, J.A. Singer, Carlson,
Nelligan, & Vyse (1994) found that depressed individuals were less
likely to recall specific self-defining memories when asked to retrieve a
positive memory, while they did not differ in memory specificity for
negative memories. Williams (1996), though not specifically addressing
self-defining memories, has argued that a lack of memory specificity in
depressed and suicidal individuals reflects a cognitive deficit general-
ized from a learned defense against encoding and retrieving affectively
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threatening self-relevant experiences. In sum, a broad range of studies
has demonstrated that self-defining memories are linked to central goals
or conflicts within the individual, while at the same time they provide
integrative lessons or insights. Finally, these memories through their
affective quality and content can play an important role in mood
regulation processes for non-depressed individuals.
SELF-DEFINING MEMORIES IN THE SMS MODEL
In considering how SDMs are part of the SMS model, we examine the re-
lationship of SDMs to the Long-term Self. We conceive of SDMs as par-
ticularly powerful integrations of personal scripts within the
Conceptual Self and knowledge within the Autobiographical Knowl-
edge Base that is linked thematically to these scripts. The underlying
theory behind this integration of conceptual and episodic knowledge is
Tomkins’s (1979, 1987) script theory. Tomkins considered affect to be the
central motivating system of personality. Individuals strive to maximize
positive affect and minimize negative affect, as well as communicate
and control their emotions. To accomplish these affective ends, individ-
uals develop cognitive-affective structures called “scripts” that organize
experience and direct thought and behavior. Scripts are built from
“scenes.” A scene is the basic unit of personality consisting of an affect
(e.g., sadness, happiness, fear) and the object of that affect. Scenes can
grow in complexity to contain sequences of action, affect, and outcomes.
“Psychological magnification” is the linking of one scene to another
through the connection of the same affective pattern shared across
scenes. Similar to a semantic memory process, accumulated similar
scenes yield an abstracted script. The script is “an individual’s rules for
predicting, interpreting, responding to, and controlling a magnified set
of scenes” (Tomkins, 1979, p. 217).
Scripts then are abstract structures within the conceptual self that con-
tain templates for sequences of actions, affects, and outcomes. Tomkins
identified several types of scripts that reflected common affective se-
quences for individuals. For example, McAdams et al. (2001) studied
contamination scripts (where positive affect is followed by a negative af-
fective outcome) and redemption scripts (where negative affect is fol-
lowed by a positive affective outcome). More generally, several different
investigators have provided empirical support for both the concept of
scripts and the process of psychological magnification (Carlson &
Carlson, 1984; Demorest, 1995; Demorest & Alexander, 1992; McAdams,
Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001; Thorne, 1995), while clinical
case studies have also demonstrated the utility of the theory (Carlson,
1981; Magai, 1996; J.A. Singer & Salovey, 1996; J.A. Singer & Blagov,
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2004a; J.A. Singer & Blagov, 2004b; J.A. Singer & J. L. Singer, 1992; J.A.
Singer & J.L. Singer, 1994). According to script theory, SDMs are memo-
rial representations that ground narrative sequences of actions, affects,
and outcomes in specific autobiographical memories.
Having specified the nature of SDMs and their relationship to struc-
tures in the SMS, we now explore the activation of a self-defining mem-
ory in the SMS in response to goal status change. According to the above
account of goal-driven episodic memories, they are being formed, and
lost, fairly continuously in response to changes in goal processing. But
relatively few of these memories become integrated with long-term
knowledge structures and even fewer with SDMs and the networks of
memories in which they are embedded. In order for this to occur, a mem-
ory or set of episodic memories must contain knowledge of high value to
central goals in the goal hierarchy of the working self. Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce (2000; see also Conway & Holmes, 2004) have suggested
that goals generated within the working self are particularly sensitive to
developmental demands across the lifespan. Developmental milestones
and challenges related to growth, autonomy, achievement, intimacy,
generativity, aging, and loss, and the existential problems they address
generate and derive from central goals (Erikson, 1959; 1963). It is
through these goals that SDMs are originally encoded and later con-
structed. Thus, SDMs will be closely associated with major
developmental goals and will become most active when these goals
undergo change.
In the SMS model goal change is always associated with appraisal ex-
perienced as affect (Oatley, 1992). Affect, however, need not be intense
and the mild satisfaction/dissatisfaction that accompanies the comple-
tion or lack of completion of most everyday tasks will not give rise to the
encoding or retrieval of SDMs. Instead goal status change must be large
enough that highly arousing affect is experienced. Numerous
goal-based models of self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1998, 1999;
Oatley, 1992; Roseman, 1984; Simon, 1967) assume that large discrepan-
cies between input and goal standards will result in more intense experi-
ences of affect. This alerting arousal will immediately engage the self,
activating non-conscious affect routines (LeDoux, 1996), and will also
spread activation throughout the autobiographical knowledge base of
the extended self and the various knowledge structures of the concep-
tual self. Self-defining memories are then especially sensitive to status
changes in developmentally important goals and the related intense
affect to which these status changes give rise.
Normally, the working self relies on ongoing self-in-world models
that consist of goal hierarchies, self-other images, and life facts. These
working self-models guide attention and require relatively little con-
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scious processing once directed action in response to the working self
model is initiated. Control processes within the extant working self tend
to limit the activation of competing working selves and their associated
goals, images, life facts, and connections to the self. Episodic memories
that are relevant to the goal of the extant working self are activated
through direct retrieval with little effort or conscious recall. These epi-
sodic memories reflect very little conceptual processing or active inte-
gration with self-structures stored in the self. They are relatively
self-contained autonomous quanta of memory that accrue to the typical
goals that individuals pursue in the course of daily activities.
When the working self model confronts a change in goal status (an im-
portant goal in the hierarchy is achieved, blocked, or experienced as in
direct conflict with another goal in the hierarchy), an affective triggering
process occurs. Patterns of activation that connect to the self increase
rapidly, sending the working self into retrieval mode. The intensity of
affect and activation is escalated when a developmentally central goal is
in question. Now the control processes of the working self, guided in-
creasingly by the arousal feedback of affective processes, direct
attentional focus to input from the long-term self in order to achieve ef-
fective categorization, evaluation, and prioritizing of the goal status
change.
A retrieval model instantiates information simultaneously from the
conceptual self and autobiographical knowledge base. Personal scripts
from the conceptual self specify a goal-action-affect sequence relevant to
the working self goal under scrutiny, while autobiographical knowl-
edge sets limits and activation constraints on the personal scripts gener-
ated by the conceptual self. The activated personal script further
organizes the search through autobiographical knowledge—leading to
specification of lifetime periods and general events that then guide se-
lection of specific memory images from the episodic store. These pat-
terns of activations are, in fact, yielding past working selves (past goal
states, self-other images or life facts) that might have relevance to the
particular goal status change now under scrutiny.
As more automatic affective processes continue to press for response to
the goal status change, the long-term self increasingly organizes its search
through autobiographical knowledge based on the scripted template, fi-
nally yielding a specific self-defining memory, an integrated representa-
tion of the self, others, goal, action, outcome, and affective response. This
“recollective” representation that emerges in consciousness provides
goal-relevant cognitive and affective information and guidance to the
working self in response to the goal status change (see Figure 3).
Due to the density of imagery and affect associated with the memory
and its extensive connection to similar memories that share its theme
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and affective quality, the self-defining memory can preoccupy much of
the attentional resources of the working self and dominate the control
processes involved in the ongoing categorization, evaluation, and
prioritizing of information related to the goal. The result is that the cur-
rent experience is interpreted through the goal-action-affect structure of
the self-defining memory’s underlying script. In effect, the self-defining
memory and its associated conceptual script co-opt the image generat-
ing aspects of the episodic memory system, imposing a structure of
goal-self-other images-life facts on its encoding functions. This means
that new memories that are generated in conjunction with the working
self are highly prone to fit the existing narrative sequence of the acti-
vated self-defining memory. This is precisely what Tomkins meant by
psychological magnification, and though it can allow for efficient, fo-
510 CONWAY ET AL.
FIGURE 3. Generation of self-defining memories.
cused, and integrated processing of new goal-relevant experiences, it
can also produce distorted and over-determined interpretations of situ-
ations that actually bear only slight resemblance to the self-defining
memory’s imposed pattern, i.e., memory errors in departures from
adaptive correspondence.
The risk is that self-defining memories activated under affectively in-
tense circumstances may lack an appropriate distance from ongoing ex-
perience. The merging of the psychological present and “remembered
reality” means a breakdown in the balance between adaptive correspon-
dence (i.e., a reasonably accurate rendering of immediate past events)
and self-coherence (i.e., retrieval from the long-term self of episodic and
conceptual knowledge structures that help to give meaning to experi-
ence). Social psychologists interested in the influence of self processes
on the interpretation of social phenomena have demonstrated many in-
stances in which the need for self-consistency or the desire to protect
self-esteem leads to distortions of remembered experience. For example,
Giesler Josephs, and Swann (1996), in a research program on “self-verifi-
cation,” have demonstrated that depressed individuals will recall con-
firming unfavorable information about themselves in order to maintain a
coherent and predictable view of themselves. Kwan and her colleagues
(Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & Robin, 2004) have documented how indi-
viduals engaged in “self-enhancement” will filter information to pro-
duce the most favorable self-evaluation compared to judgments by
others. In either case, these efforts at consistency or enhancement illus-
trate how the long-term self may distort or counteract more veridical
rendering of immediate past events. These breakdowns in accuracy can
induce many of the contradictory interpretations of events by
individuals that often lead to interpersonal conflict.
ADULT ATTACHMENT STYLES AND SELF-DEFINING
MEMORIES
To examine this last point in depth, we present ongoing research (Tagini,
Conway & Meins, 2004) on one form of mental model that can become
dominant in the working self—the Internal Working Model of relation-
ships (IWM, Bowlby, 1973, 1980) and its expression in self-defining
memories. The following protocols from this research demonstrate how
complex interactions of IWMs across the conceptual self, autobiographi-
cal knowledge base, and episodic memory invoke self-defining memo-
ries that influence the working self’s efforts at adaptive correspondence
to current goal activity.
Within the developmental framework of attachment theory, Bowlby
(1969/1982,1973, 1980) postulated that individuals form mental models,
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named internal working models (IWMs), which are abstracted from
their experience with primary caregivers during childhood. IWMs orga-
nize goal-oriented cognitive and emotional processing in attachment-re-
lated contexts (Main, 1995) and mediate characteristic modes of relating
to others and the surrounding world (Bowlby, 1980). Due to their long-
standing role in organizing interpersonal responses of the self, IWMs
tend to be recruited to guide processing during periods where goal sta-
tus changes or challenges threaten the integrity of self-coherence. In
terms of our current thinking about the SMS, we can conceive of IWMs
as particular instantiations of the WS that include components of the
conceptual self and the autobiographical knowledge base. An IWM en-
compasses autobiographical knowledge from childhood, some episodic
memories, core conceptual beliefs about the self and significant others,
and above all, goal structures forming the nucleus of the working self
goal hierarchy.
Individual differences in adults’ IWMs can be inferred by means of a
narrative measure, the Adult Attachment Interview (A.A.I.; George,
Kaplan, & Main, 1984). During the A.A.I., individuals are required to ac-
cess and reflect on plausible autobiographical memories. At the same
time, participants need to engage in task monitoring to maintain a coher-
ent and collaborative discourse (Hesse, 1996). A.A.I. protocols are as-
signed to one of three attachment categories (Main & Goldwyn, 1998):
Secure-Autonomous, when the narrative of childhood experiences is co-
herent and plausible and specific autobiographical memories are
easily accessed;
Preoccupied or Entangled, when the narratives indicate an excessive
and confused or angry preoccupation with attachment figures or
with traumatic events;
Dismissing, when the discourse is aimed at reducing attention to unfa-
vorable childhood experiences by failing to recall specific memo-
ries or by dismissing the self-relevance of negative experiences.1
One might consider these attachment patterns and the associated mem-
ories as reflecting different orientations of the relative balance between
adaptive correspondence and self-coherence. The secure individual, as
defined by the A.A.I., has developed a cognitive-affective processing
style that allows the self to engage with, and step back from, ongoing ex-
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1. Two additional categories have been described: involving a brief disorganization of
discourse (Unresolved, Main & Solomon, 1990) when discussing traumatic experiences, or
failure to maintain a strategy in the interview as a whole (Cannot Classify, Hesse, 1996).
perience. This knowledge processing style parallels the fluid interaction
of the secure mother-child dyad, with the child’s reliance on its care-
giver’s consistent accessibility and contingent responses permitting a
comfortable rhythm of exploration of the world and return to the
familiar.
In contrast, the two insecure styles of attachment have associated pro-
cessing styles that lack the flexibility and openness of the secure individ-
ual. Although insecure individuals invoke their familiar ways of
organizing the world to retain a sense of self-coherence in the face of goal
threat, both processing styles fail to achieve an optimal balance between
the demands of accurate short-term processing and retrieval of
knowledge from the long-term self.
Due to a history of unpredictable and contradictory care-giving, the
preoccupied individual has developed a hyper-vigilant processing style
(Main, 1995) that allows for little abstraction and emotional distance
from remembered experience. The resulting conflation of immediate
and long-term knowledge often leads to confusing tangents, misinter-
pretations of cues, and unregulated intense affect. Although this chaotic
response to goal challenge recreates the childhood experience, and
therefore achieves a sense of familiarity and self-coherence, it is hardly
functional for problem-solving and effective goal attainment in
interpersonal situations.
In contrast, dismissing individuals have developed an IWM based on
a consistent experience of rejection or neglect by caregivers. Their defen-
sive response is one of avoidance and minimization (Main, 1995). Rather
than engage in hypervigilance to try to identify and predict the threat-
ened assault on the self, dismissing individuals attempt to divert atten-
tion from potential harm inflicted by the caregiver. Self-coherence is
maintained in the face of goal threat by a denial of any elements within
immediate sensory-perceptual experience or the long-term self that
would allow acknowledgement of strong negative emotion.
The first example from our research is that of a self-defining memory
recalled by a participant, Ruth, whose A.A.I. protocol was classified as
secure-autonomous. Ruth’s A.A.I. narratives were coherent and realis-
tic, and she was able to shift effortlessly between recollecting detailed
memories and evaluating past attachment experiences in terms of the
present. Ruth’s SDM recounts a particularly distressing but significant
episode from her adolescence:
I remember how nasty I could be to my Mum. That always comes back to me
whenever I’m remotely not very nice to anyone...That one time, when I was
shopping for shoes for school, and I was especially nasty to her, that’s the one
memory that I always get. We were shopping for school-shoes and I was being
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deliberately obnoxious. I was saying, ‘I don’t like these ones, and I don’t like
those, go and get me other ones’. And then it was as if something clicked in my
head, when she said, ‘If you don’t stop being like this, I’ll cry in the middle of the
shop!’ And then it just dawned on me, what I’d been doing, I was about twelve
or thirteen. I think that was the start of me thinking, I have to be nice to people."
During the Self-defining Memory Task, Ruth recalled diversely themed
memories, which referred to a variety of relationship and achievement
themes. The memories were both highly specific and integrative (Blagov
& J.A. Singer, 2004), reflecting the ability to merge affect and cognition in
an optimal manner. As in the memory cited above, Ruth repeatedly de-
scribed how she employed her memories to regulate her current emo-
tions and interpersonal interactions, demonstrating a highly adaptive
directive function. Ruth was able to move fluidly between the demands
of adaptive correspondence (current goal-relevant experiences) and
self-coherence (more abstract knowledge from the self). The apparent
boundaries between these two aspects of the working self were more
open or permeable for her, allowing for both the assimilation of and,
accommodation to, ongoing experience.
Consider next a SDM recalled by a participant whose A.A.I. received a
primary classification of Preoccupied. During the A.A.I., Mnemosyne
described her mother as alternating violent rejection of her daughter’s
attachment needs with over-protectiveness. Both parents had unrealis-
tic expectations concerning her academic and artistic achievements.
Mnemosyne’s memory narrative was disrupted by her current involved
anger towards her mother. The discourse was confused, excessively de-
tailed and contradictory, reflecting her experience of her mother’s
caregiving behavior (Main, 1995). Mnemosyne recalled when she first
performed in a play and failed to remember her lines during a soliloquy:
“And I remember the first two acts of the play, were absolutely fine. And then I
got to the third act, and I can’t even remember how I went wrong, but my legs
were shaking, and I went wrong so drastically ... and it shocked me so much,
that I forgot my lines, I couldn’t tell where I was anymore, I couldn’t tell how to
recover...But I just remember feeling absolutely humiliated! ... And my parents,
god, I didn’t even want to think about what they were thinking! Cause I was
thinking about how disappointed they were, how embarrassed they were on my
behalf, embarrassed for themselves, and how angry they would be because I’d
done badly, and just you know ... later they said, they said stuff along the lines
of, ‘You acted really badly. And what went wrong? Why? You know, did you
not rehearse hard enough?’ ... And they’d say, ‘Oh no, the other people, you
could tell, we were looking at their faces, and at some point we didn’t even want
to look at their faces, cause we were embarrassed. And you know, we couldn’t
believe you’d acted that badly’, and you know, ‘Why? Why did you do that?’ ... I
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remember thinking, ‘You know, what did I do to deserves this? I mean, you
know, am I being punished for something’...”
All but one of Mnemosyne’s self-defining memories reiterated the same
theme: the failure to attain a goal and the consequent humiliation by her
caregivers. Her SDMs consisted of clusters of specific, negatively
valenced memories. These were interspersed with what she defined as
“rambling,” that is, extensive descriptions of loosely related general
events and associated conceptual commentaries.
Mnemosyne’s proliferation of memories suggests a deficit in the regu-
lation of affect and recall processes. Her re-experiencing of past adverse
experiences compromises her capacity for adaptive correspondence and
brings about a disengagement from the present context, disrupting cur-
rent cognitive and contextual processing. As a consequence, both source
memory errors (e.g., confusing memories and dreams during the A.A.I.)
and task-monitoring errors (forgetting the interview context during the
SDM task) occurred.
Mnemosyne was overwhelmed by a near past experience and the in-
tensity of her associated affect. Her SDM indicates the potentially
destabilizing effect of remembering in the absence of selective control
processes that constrain the working self. The lack of control processes is
clear from the vignette, which originally consisted of 2,385 words. As
Mnemosyne explained: “it just seems like things will flood into my
head...I can think of a memory, and a million things will come to mind ...I
do sometimes really get bogged down in the emotions and feelings of it
all...”
The potential for her SDMs to serve an integrative function, as Ruth’s
memories do, is reduced by the lack of distance from the remembered re-
ality. One possible explanation for this lack of perspective is that the
original working self goal structure through which these memories were
encoded remains highly active. Consequently when these vivid attach-
ment memories are accessed, activation rises still further and spreads
through the knowledge base in an unconstrained way with the effect of
“a million things” coming to mind. It is as if the self, still prone to re-
spond to the unpredictability of threat that repeatedly surfaced in child-
hood, can only operate in one mode of preoccupied concern and
heightened affective response.
In contrast to Mnemosyne, the last example is a SDM recalled by an in-
dividual whose A.A.I. was classified as Dismissing. Violet persistently
failed to support the bland positive descriptions of her parents with spe-
cific memories. From her narratives about childhood experiences it
could in fact be inferred that the parents had been emotionally aloof and
unavailable.
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I’m not sure if this is what it’s supposed to be ...I don’t really have any specific
thing that I say, ‘Well this is what I love to do, and this is my pattern, this is
what I put my life into doing’. Ahm, sort of not sports, music or theatre or any-
thing like that, it’s sort of always, kind of, my interests branch off into all these
different things, but nothing that I could go and say, well that is the one thing
that kind of I was born to do. And I think that maybe that has to do with the fact
that I’ve moved around and have always had to, kind of, change and adapt to
what’s been available at any given place. And I can’t remember any sort of ever
having always done one thing, like having gone every Tuesday go to ballet class
or something, and hence really loving ballets and going to ballets and things like
that. Ahm, so I don’t know, that’s kind of an absence of a memory which is
self-defining."
Violet recalled only three self-defining memories, all consisting of emo-
tionless descriptions of activities. These memories conveyed a vague,
diffuse sense of self, and significant others were subsumed under the ge-
neric term “we.” Her self-defining memories were over-general, struc-
turally similar to those observed in depressed samples (Williams, 1996),
although depression was ruled out by her Beck’s (1996) Depression In-
ventory score of zero. Violet’s self-defining “absence of memory” might
be thought of in terms of the activity of inhibitory processes of the work-
ing self that control access to the autobiographical knowledge base.
Memory construction is terminated at the level of general events and she
is unable to bring specific episodic memories to mind. In this case the
need for self-coherence hinders the formation of links between recalled
autobiographical knowledge and remembered reality.
This type of defense probably serves two functions: first it keeps spe-
cific details of experiences from the working self that might be
destabilizing and threatening for its goal structure as well as for the be-
lief structures of the conceptual self. Second, it allows construction of
versions of the self and other (‘as if’ versions), which are not constrained
by remembered reality. These mildly delusional self-other conceptual-
izations support a version of interpersonal reality that does not threaten
working self goals. Additionally we may speculate that since the work-
ing self also modulates encoding (Conway, 2001), the lack of specific
memory could reflect a process of “selective inattention” (Sullivan,
1953) to attachment-related issues, with subsequent fewer episodic
memories being integrated in the autobiographical memory knowledge
base.
The defensive over-regulation of attention and recall echoes the ob-
servable dismissal of attachment needs by children who are assigned to
the equivalent attachment category (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978; Main, 1995). Violet described her memory difficulties in the fol-
lowing manner, “If I start trying really, really hard, I have the feeling that
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it is kind of tiring, I stop, because you can’t force it. The more you look ...
the less you think of something.” This comment suggests a sustained in-
hibition by the working self of access to autobiographical knowledge
and episodic memories.
MEMORIES OF TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE: DEFENSIVE
FUNCTIONS OF THE WORKING SELF
If people with dismissing attachment patterns have attenuated access to
the autobiographical knowledge base, then patients suffering from post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) surely have the reverse: uncontrollable
intrusions of vividly recollected episodic memories of their trauma ex-
perience. However, and as we shall see, the working self and conceptual
self may also operate here to protect the integrity of the SMS from
extreme goal change.
Indeed we might note at the outset one comment that appears to be al-
most universally made by those who have recovered from their PTSD
symptoms is that they are a different person now from the person who
existed before the trauma. Trauma ultimately is imposed upon the self
and to be traumatic must contain a threat to the self- system. Often this is
in the form of near death experiences or severe physical injury coupled
with very negative cognition and affect. The cases in this section are
taken from Conway, Meares, & Standart (2004) and they illustrate how
the SMS responds to extreme duress.
CASE 1. MEMORY FOR A ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
A man who drove cars for a living was involved in a road traffic acci-
dent. He was a back seat passenger in a car when it was in a high speed
collision with another vehicle; activation of the air bags in the front of the
car produced a cloud of powder, which he thought at the time was
smoke. At the time he could smell petrol and thought the car might ig-
nite and remembers thinking ‘I will be burned alive.’ His wife was un-
conscious after the impact and he thought that she had died. He
remembered thinking to himself ‘What am I going to do now?’ as he
thought about his future alone without his wife.
Subsequently he experienced severe guilt about this thought, which
suggested to him that he was a selfish person. It became one of his intru-
sive flashbacks and always induced an overwhelming guilt. In addition,
he was a highly professional driver and he had anticipated the crash, but
did not cry out. He felt that he could have averted the crash if he had
done this. He experienced intrusive thoughts, such as ‘I should have
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shouted’ (to warn the driver) and he relived the feeling of guilt he felt
when he thought his wife had died, which he believed to be his fault
because he did not shout out.
In this case the intense guilt and anxiety experienced when he intru-
sively recalled his failure to shout out was destabilizing, so much so that
daily activities were disrupted. During cognitive behavioral therapy,
however, which included re-imagining the event and a visit to the actual
crash site—it became apparent that the way in which the accident oc-
curred (the speed and orientation of the vehicles and their very rapid
collision) meant that there could not have been sufficient time to shout a
warning. It then became apparent that his flashback contained a time ex-
pansion distortion and once the patient was able to recognize this, the in-
trusiveness of the memory and its associated experience of guilt and
anxiety diminished.
This memory distortion is particularly interesting as it served to make
the patient responsible for the accident and in so doing it kept from
awareness a far more destabilizing cognition: that not only was he not
responsible but in fact the accident had been completely beyond his con-
trol. This meant abandoning the core belief that he was always in control
when driving. This would mean revision to the conceptual self and asso-
ciated goal change. We believe that one general operating principle of
the SMS is the avoidance of change, especially change to goals and the
conceptual self. This may be because the cognitive and affective costs of
such change are high and, moreover, there is usually no guarantee that
new goals and new models of the self will be any more effective than
those they replace. Distorting an episodic memory in order to resist
change may then be one defense the working self has against
widespread goal change.
CASE 2. MEMORY FOR A FALL
A young man suffered severe PTSD after he fell off an oil rig. When first
seen, almost two years after his fall, he had severe depression and
marked PTSD. He had a vivid and intrusive memory of falling down an
interior shaft in the oil rig platform wearing a heavy workman’s tool
belt. This was accompanied by intense anxiety that he would fall into
water and drown. In reality, however, there was a metal grid at the bot-
tom of the shaft but it was not present in his flashback in which the sun
was very bright and reflected back up the shaft making the grid difficult
to see. The culmination of his fall was in hitting the grid where he suf-
fered a severe head injury. In therapy the patient and therapist worked
at drawing the grid back into his flashback image. When they achieved
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this, after several sessions, he then suddenly remembered the pain he
felt as he hit the grid. This was followed by the realization that he was
alive. From this point his depression fell and PTSD symptoms, including
the frequency of memory intrusions, subsided. From the present per-
spective this is an instance of the working self distorting a memory in
order to protect against recalling intense physical pain.
Finally, consider how this protective function can work for intense
negative emotion.
CASE 3. AN EYEWITNESS TO THE SEPT. 11TH ATTACKS
A middle-aged woman observed the planes going into World Trade
Center from a street close by. Two months later she was referred to the
CBT clinic and appeared to be very distressed, anxious, and with
marked avoidance. She had a powerful distorted image flashback in
which she saw herself high above the ground observing the collision of
plane and building. The scene is very peaceful and there is no noise.
Whenever the image intruded into consciousness, which it frequently
did, she felt intense, destabilizing guilt. In therapy it was realized that
this image meant strong avoidance of the actual memory. Early in her
treatment she started to practice at imaging, coming back to ground,
hearing the cries of the crowd standing around her (as they had in real
life), and to feel strong emotions of anger and fear. After only a few ses-
sions practicing this, she had reinstated her original perspective and
could be aware of the strong negative emotions she felt at the time. Re-
gaining her original perspective was associated with a sharp reduction
in his PTSD symptoms and a restoration of her memories of witnessing
the attack.
These transitory memory errors of time distortion, lost details, and
radically changed perspective are all violating what we earlier termed
‘adaptive correspondence.’ These memories contradict the accurate ren-
dering of reality that is necessary for survival value. Indeed, consistent
misrepresenting of experience might entail a significant survival cost. In
the above cases the influence of the long term self has been to distort epi-
sodic memories temporarily in order to maintain existing self-coher-
ence. (Note that we are not suggesting that this occurs in all or even the
majority of cases of PTSD. The cases we have described here, and in
Conway, Mearers, & Standart 2004, simply illustrate how the SMS might
give rise to memory distortion in memory for extreme experiences). If, as
we have suggested, the SMS operates on a principle of conservatism and
resists change or only supports gradual change, then these distortions
might be adaptive in the sense that they delay radical change to self-con-
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ceptions and working self goals. But as the distorted memories form part
of the PTSD symptoms of intrusive flashbacks, it might be that the dis-
tortions retain a strong link to the working self goals and self-concep-
tions through which they were encoded and frequently intrude into
awareness because of that link (cf. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In
effect they signal that something is wrong with that part of the goal
system, without signaling exactly what, which would lead to (extensive)
self-change.
EMOTION REMEMBERED IN TRANQUILITY:
WORDSWORTH’S POETIC IMAGINATION
To conclude this paper, we would like to speculate about the role of the
SMS in the generation of creative products of the imagination. Our argu-
ment is essentially that much artistic activity involves a capacity to move
flexibly between the rich sensory and perceptual world of immediate ex-
perience and the more distant knowledge of remembered reality and
past working selves. As he worked with his friend and fellow poet, Sam-
uel Taylor Coleridge, to create a new aesthetic of lyric poetry in the be-
ginning of the 19th century, William Wordsworth, the prominent
English Romantic poet, stated a similar position in his Preface to Lyrical
Ballads, with Pastoral and Other Poems (1802),
I have said that Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feel-
ings: it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquility: the emo-
tion is contemplated till by a species of reaction the tranquility
disappears, and an emotion, kindred to that which was before the sub-
ject of contemplation, is gradually produced, and does itself actually ex-
ist in the mind. (Wordsworth, 1802/1984, p. 611)
The power of poetic creation lies neither in an immediate unfiltered ac-
count of recent experience, nor in the removed reserve of abstracted ret-
rospection. Only through one’s capacity to synthesize the adaptive
correspondence of the working self’s depiction of reality with the
long-term self’s contemplation of that past self does an emotionally-in-
formed imaginative product emerge.
Three of Wordsworth’s greatest poems, Lines Written a Few Miles above
Tintern Abbey, Ode (there was a time; also known as Intimations of Immortal-
ity), and The Prelude are all poems that contemplate the relationship of
more remote memories to the poet’s current imaginative efforts to recre-
ate and make sense of these earlier experiences (Lau, 2002a, 2002b). A
common thread through all three poems is Wordsworth’s recognition
that for memories to continue to claim emotional power and inspiration,
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they must be re-translated through the imaginative process of the
contemplative self.
For example, in Book 7 of The Prelude (1805 version, in Wordsworth,
1984), Wordsworth writes of a period he spent in London immediately
after university as a time in which he recorded a variety of experiences,
but subsequently did little to integrate them with the core concerns of his
long-term self. He refers to such unmediated recollections (what we
would consider poorly contextualized episodic memories) as
...the curious props
By which the perishable hours of life
Rest on each other, and the world of thought
Exists and is sustained. (Book 7, lines 493-496)
When contemplating these memories, he writes that the “...imaginative
Power/Languishes within me” (Book 7, lines, 499-500). In another mem-
orable phrase, he indicates these memories of perishable hours, despite
their emotional intensity at the time, fail to pass beyond the “suburbs of
the mind” (Book 7, line, 507) and do not lead to poetic inspiration due to
their failure to engage enduring concerns of the self.
In contrast, Wordsworth identifies “spots of time” (Book 11, lines
258-278) that retain a “distinct preeminence” (Book 11, line 259) and rise
above the “...the round of ordinary intercourse” (Book 11, lines 263-264).
It is precisely because these moments of memory have been integrated
with the greater depth of the self that they retain their power in the
imagination
This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks
Among those passages of life in which
We have had deepest feeling that the mind
Is lord and master, and that the outward sense
Is but the obedient servant of her will.
(Book 11, lines 269-273)
In other words, these original memories have linked with the mind’s
own power, and the integration of rich records of experience with the
mind’s pre-existing ideas lifts the self to the creative realm of poetry.
In another poem from this period of his life, Ode (There was a time),
Wordsworth had raised the concern that the vivid power of previous ep-
isodic memories, particularly those from childhood, are lost forever to
the adult, whose current concerns and goal pursuits are radically differ-
ent from the child,
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There was a time when meadow, grove, and stream,
The earth, and every common sight,
To me did seem
Apparrelled in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.
It is not now as it has been of yore;-
Turn wheresoe’er I may
By night or day,
The things which I have seen, I now can see no more.
(Wordsworth, 1807/1984, p. 296, Lines 1-9)
However, as the poem unfolds, Wordsworth expresses the view that al-
though unmediated memories of childhood experience are lost to the
older self, the long-term self is able to reconstruct these memories
through the filter of more recent working selves. This reconstructive
process gives an additional depth and meaning to the former memories,
Though nothing can bring back the hour
Of splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower;
We will grieve not, rather find
Strength in what remains behind,
In the primal sympathy
Which having been must ever be,
In the soothing thoughts that spring
Out of human suffering,
In the faith that looks through death,
In years that bring the philosophic mind.
(Wordsworth, 1807/1984, lines 182-189)
Not unlike the individuals who recovered from PTSD described earlier
in this paper, Wordsworth had come to understand that we must inevi-
tably look at the past through the lens of our current goals and mean-
ing-making (see Pennebaker, 1995). Otherwise, we will remain haunted
by moments that are irrevocable and incapable of revision. Creative and
healthy memory is never simply a recursive loop of past records, but
rather a look backward that takes the individual forward in
understanding and self-knowledge.
The contribution of autobiographical memory to the self is its capacity
to render accurate records of the working self’s engagement in goal ac-
tivity, while at the same time insuring that such activities reinforce the
coherence of the long-term self. Vivid and affectively intense goal-ori-
ented memories, such as self-defining memories, can aid in this process,
as long as the balance between adaptive correspondence and self-coher-
ence is not overwhelmed. In individuals for whom attachment struggles
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or recent trauma have raised significant challenges to goal attainment,
the long-term self’s demand for coherence may compromise memory’s
base in reality and undermine the working self’s effort to achieve this
delicate balance. In contrast, the appropriate blending of emotional rec-
ollection of reality through the lens of the philosophic mind may lead to
the creative state that Wordsworth praises in his lines in Tintern Abbey - a
state to which we might all aspire,
...and in after years,
When these wild ecstasies shall be matured
Into a sober pleasure, when thy mind
Shall be a mansion for all lovely forms,
Thy memory be as a dwelling place
For all sweet sounds and harmonies.
(Wordsworth, 1798/1984, lines 138-143)
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